What demographic problem? Yoram Ettinger May 28, 2006 1. Demographic fatalism underlies the assumption that a retreat from geography – which possesses a critical security significance – is required to salvage Jewish demography. Demographic fatalism (that Jews are, supposedly, doomed to be a minority west of the Jordan River) has marginalized the role played by the issues of History and Security in Israel’s political debate about Judea & Samaria. 2. The “Prophets of Demographic Doom” have managed to weaken the resolve of the Jewish State – and its friends - more effectively than have Palestinian terrorism and global pressure. They’ve instilled unprecedented faintheartedness in the national state of mind - a self-destruct prescription in the Mideast. 3. However, the “Prophecy of Demographic Doom” has been based on grossly erroneous assumptions and on misrepresentations. In fact, a 67:33 Jewish majority has been in effect west of the Jordan River (without Gaza), at least, since 1967! Long term trend indicates a rise in Jewish birth rate with sustained positive migration (Aliya), while Palestinians experience (since 1990) a decline in birth rate and a high annual emigration. 4. Enclosed you’ll find an OpEd on the Jewish Demographic Momentum in Israel, which sheds light on some of the misrepresentations perpetrated by the “Prophets of Demographic Doom” (JTA, May 2006, ). The OpEd was written by Bennett Zimmerman, Dr. Roberta Seid and Dr. Michael Wise. 5. Corroborated by evidence from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Central Elections Commission, a 70% inflation in the number of Arabs in Judea & Samaria has been documented. 6. According to Dr. Nick Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the recent study on Palestinian demography “caught the demographic profession asleep at the switch.” 7. For more information on the demographic study – which featured at a March 8, 2006 House International Relations Mideast Subcommittee hearing. JTA, May 4, 2006, OpEd by Bennett Zimmerman, Dr. Roberta Seid and Dr. Michael Wise: Arab Demographic Momentum has become part of the Israel lexicon. In this theory, population growth in the Arab sector will overwhelm the Jewish population as ‘baby boom’ generations give birth to an even greater number of children. Arab births will accelerate even if birth rates remain stable or drop slightly because such a large number of women will enter their childbearing years. But the evidence is now in: demographic momentum exists — but the momentum is occurring among Jews, not Arabs. Jewish births grew rapidly, from 80,000 per year in 1995 to 96,000 in 2000 and to over 103,000 in 2003. The demographic outlook for Jews has been improving because the Jewish total fertility rate (TFR), or the number of children a woman is likely to bear over her lifetime, has been rising. In 2005, it reached 2.7, the highest rate in any advanced industrial nation. While the ultra-Orthodox contributed to this rise, secular Israelis and the immigrants from the FSU also experienced increasing fertility. When aliyah and returning Israelis (averaging over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004), are added to the mix, the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further. In contrast, the absolute number of births in the Israel Arab sector grew from 36,500 births in 1995 to 40,800 in 2000 and has remained there ever since. In fact, after rising slightly to a record 41,400 births in 2003, the number of Israel Arabs births fell for the first time in 2004 to 40,800. The overall Israel Arab fertility figure (which includes Israel Moslem, Christian Arabs, and Druze) declined from 4.4 in 2000 to 4.0 in 2004. Israel recently enacted policies that are impacting the highest fertility sectors of the Israel Arab population. In 2004, the government stopped granting stipends for every child born to a family, restricting them to only the first two children born. There was an immediate drop in Bedouin pregnancies. The problem with demographic predictions is that they apply yesterday’s or today’s fertility rates to tomorrow’s forecast. However, earlier childbearing patterns may have little relationship to the number of children the next generation will have. By applying the Muslim TFR rates from the 1960s (between 9-10 births per woman) to forecasts, Israeli demographers had projected that Israeli Arabs would overtake Israeli Jews by 1990. When the TFR dropped to 5.4 in the early 1980s and 4.7 in the second half of the decade, demographers applied this rate to their next series of forecasts. However, by 2005, the Arab TFR had dropped even further, to 4.0, echoing the more dramatic drops reported throughout the Middle East where most nations display fertility levels near 3 births per woman while countries such as Iran have displayed fertility below 2 births per woman. Furthermore, Israel Arab women currently in their 20s will not necessarily repeat the same childbearing characteristics of today’s 30 year olds. Thus, Israeli Arab women who are having fewer children in their late teens and 20s might have fewer children in their 30s than today’s 30 year olds who still display fertility characteristics of earlier generations. In contrast, Israeli Jewish women in their 20s might carry their choice to have more children into their 30s, at numbers above the current set of 30 year olds. The practice of applying yesterday’s activity to tomorrow’s forecast is a common mistake. The UN Population Division had confidently predicted in 2000 that the world’s population would balloon to 12 billion people by 2050. Remarkably enough, four years later, they dramatically revised the forecast and now predict that today’s 6.3 billion global population will plateau at 9 billion persons by 2050. With constantly changing birth patterns, what is a forecaster to do? To have any relevance a forecast must constantly be updated with the most current information and any changes in trend. The Gallup organization recently published the results of a survey which showed a convergence in desired family size among Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan. The ideal family size has fallen to 5.1 for Arabs in Gaza and 4.5 in the West Bank. The desired family size among Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs is now identical at 3.7. While Gallup found no difference in the preferred number of children by younger Israelis, younger West Bankers aged 15 – 19 believe an ideal family should have 4.1 children versus their older relatives over 50 years who believe the ideal family has 5.0 children. The convergence in desired birth activity among Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and particularly among younger West Bankers is likely to further impact the future demographic outlook for Israel and the West Bank, where Jews now form a two-thirds majority. Demographers had concentrated on past patterns in the Arab population while they were blind sighted to evidence of a slowdown in the Arab sector and the demographic revolution already being measured among Jews. By focusing on the past, forecasters anticipated demographic momentum in the wrong sector and produced an outlook that couldn’t even get the present correct, let alone the future. Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise are authors of Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza: The Million Person Gap, recently published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel. Forecast for Israel and West Bank 2025 debuted at the Herzliya Policy Conference in Israel and in the USA at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. The studies can be found at |
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