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Storm warnings from Lebanon By Gerald M. Steinberg (August 18, 2001) - A few weeks ago, at the end of his first year in office, Prime Minister Ehud Barak could point to one clear accomplishment the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Despite the opposition of the military, and dire warnings that this move would end in disaster for Israel, the quick withdrawal, and, more importantly, its aftermath, seemed largely successful. With the exception of some stone-throwing incidents along the border, and Hizbullah's "victory" celebrations and flag-raising exercises, all was quiet. In the ten weeks since the IDF's exit, no rockets have been fired at Kiryat Shmona, and there have been no terrorist incursions from Lebanon. However, with each passing day, the hopes for a peaceful border decrease, and the old tensions and threats are returning. The Israeli government has recorded and reported over 200 border violations from the Lebanese side, and a number of soldiers have been injured. The tensions orchestrated by Hizbullah and Palestinian groups, with the encouragement of Syria's old guard, are increasing, as firebombs replace stones. The security alert following the infiltration by two Lebanese Druze (former SLA members) across the border illustrated the anxiety in Israel. Despite the calming images transmitted during Ehud and Nava Barak's recent vacation near the border, Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh's inspection trip demonstrated that for the Israeli government, the clashes and potential for renewed terrorism are becoming major problems. Instead of a few days, as had been expected, the UN took almost two months to demarcate the border, allowing the Lebanese government, directed by Syria, to slow the process to a snail's pace. The large numbers of UN peacekeeping troops that Barak had been expecting have been dwindling steadily, and when they move, it is in extremely slow motion. Following threats from Hizbullah, UNIFIL avoided taking positions at the points of greatest friction, and rather than acting as a buffer force to reduce the hostility, these troops are still passive observers. They also backed away from placing a small force at the Fatma gate, opposite Metulla, where Hizbullah provides pre-positioned piles of stones for hurling at Israeli soldiers. The weakness of the UN and of the Lebanese government also reflects the failure of the countries, particularly in Europe, that proclaim their desire to contribute to peace in Lebanon and in the Middle East. Many have reneged on their commitments to provide troops to UNIFIL. In some cases, European officials use the excuse that since the border is (from a distance) quiet, their troops are unnecessary. (If conflict resumes, the same leaders will no doubt declare that until calm has been restored, troops cannot be dispatched.) As a result, UNIFIL will remain understaffed, again unable to fulfill its mission of preventing terrorist infiltration and keeping the peace along the border. The European powers that profess influence in Beirut, particularly France, have also failed to demonstrate that they can be effective. For the past ten weeks, the Lebanese army has dithered, instead of moving eagerly to reclaim the sovereignty over this area that it lost in the early 1970s. The Beirut government meekly avoids asserting itself and constraining Hizbullah, and, following Syrian orders, seeks to encourage tension along the border. Instead of sending military forces, Beirut's presence is limited to few hundred police, who carefully stay our of the "Hizbullah-stan" region. To emphasize the point, the Lebanese interior minister admitted that "The border is not our concern at this stage." As a result, conditions in Southern Lebanon are comparable, in some ways, to the vacuum of the early 1970s, when Palestinian groups, including the PLO, established a mini-state and terrorist bases. While the Lebanese government evades responsibility for preventing the use of its territory for mounting attacks against Israel, the UN asserts that "Border security is essentially the responsibility of the state of Lebanon." The door to another round of violence and escalation remains wide open. In order to prevent this old scenario from returning, the key actors still have a few weeks to rewrite the script. Hizbullah is likely to avoid escalation until after the elections during the first week of September, in order to avoid alienating those sane Lebanese voters who object to having their country used by Iranians, Syrians, and Palestinians as a base for terror. Similarly, the Palestinian forces in Lebanese refugee camps are being held in check while the negotiations with Israel seem to be continuing. If these talks end without agreement, the yellow light could switch quickly to green. For all of these reasons, the Barak government can no longer point to southern Lebanon as the shining (and only) example of its competence and success. The international community on which they naively relied has proven, once again, to be ineffective, and interested in symbols and words, rather than deeds. In the Middle East, reliance on the rational self-interest and common sense of the Lebanese and other key players is still a dangerous gamble. None of this bodes well for Barak's efforts to convince the Israeli voters to accept far greater risks when, or if, a sweeping agreement is reached with the Palestinians. |
