Dennis Ross Confesses
By Shmuel Katz
("Jerusalem Post," July 11, 2001)
We have entered an era of explanation, admission, and even confession.
Last
Friday, the "Jerusalem Post" published an explanatory interview with
Martin
Indyk, the outgoing US ambassador to Israel, while last month, Dennis
Ross,
for 12 years one of the central exponents of United States policy
before and
during the woefully misnamed Oslo "peace process" has now let the
public
into some secrets of America's thinking.
Thus Ross revealed a sensational fact which he discovered about the
so-called peace negotiations. "Arafat," he said in an interview in the
"Jerusalem
Post" (June 22), "really can't do a permanent deal." Ross enlarged on
his
point in
a public lecture at Ben-Gurion University. "Chairman Arafat could not
accept
Camp David," he declared. "It was too hard for him to make this
decision
because when the conflict ends, the cause that defines Arafat also
ends,"
(JP, June 20). What this manifestly means is that Arafat, after all, is
not
such a bad fellow, but suffers from a psychological block that he can't
overcome.
What this psychobabble does mean is that Ross is trying to avoid
telling the
truth about American policy. One well-known part of the truth is that
he and
his colleagues have been nourishing the legend that all that's needed
for
Arafat to make peace is that Israel make major surrenders of territory,
jeopardize its security and blot out the testimony of Jewish history.
The
other part of the truth is that Ross and his colleagues in the State
Department have got it all wrong. Arafat has no intention of making
peace
with the State of Israel.
Ross's apologia for Arafat - a psychological blockage which the State
Department whiz boys were unable to detect in all these years of
cosseting
him - is plainly disingenuous. There is not the slightest reason for
anybody, least of all Ross, to delve into the depths of Arafat's mind
in
order to understand why he "can't do a deal."
Arafat himself has openly, indeed defiantly, been telling the world
time
after time what his plan for Israel is. That plan is no chimera, but a
practical strategic objective. It was not created by Arafat. It was
first
announced by the spokesmen of the Arab states when, at the United
Nations in
1947, they opposed the recognition of a Jewish state - even within
indefensible borders. They followed up in 1948 by making war in order
to
abort its birth. Then, in 1967, the destruction of Israel (without
Judea,
Samaria, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai) was the declared aim of the Arab
invasion, and the dismemberment of the Jewish state is the centerpiece
of
the Palestinian Covenant.
The game plan for achieving that end has even been aired frequently by
Arafat. It is the "policy of phases." It could be called the "salami"
process. And it is perfectly rational to understand that Barak's offer
of
near-complete surrender was not enough for Arafat: there are "phases"
still
not reached, and goals still unachieved. A Palestinian state (with
Jerusalem
exclusively as its capital) has not been promised, and Israel has not
agreed
to let the so-called "refugees" flood its cities. If he were to
underwrite
peace with those hurdles not overcome, he would lose control of his own
people. Moreover, Arafat knew what he was doing. By not signing, he
left the
door open to new negotiations.
The prelude to negotiations is, as usual, killing Jews - intifada. Do
you
not hear how he is being urged by Israeli leaders now to stop terror
and "come
back to the negotiating table"? And are not the Americans doing their
best
to get Israel to negotiate even if the terror is only "reduced"? Indeed
more
light on U.S. behavior and policy after Oslo has been shed by our Ross
in an
interview in the "Australian Jewish Review," June 2001.
He actually criticizes Arafat. "You cannot be promoting incitement to
violence," he said, "and say you're committed to peace. The two are
contradictory." But pressed by his interviewer, David Mandel, about his
failure to react to Arafat's non-fulfillment of his obligations under
the
Oslo Accords, he admitted that "the prudential issues of compliance
were
neglected and politicized by the Americans in favor of keeping talks
afloat."
He went into detail. "Every time there was a behavior, or an incident,
or an
event, that was inconsistent with what the process was supposed to be
about,
the impulse was to rationalize it, finesse it, find a way around it,
and not
to allow it to beak the process," because "the process seemed to have
promise."
Thus, buses filled with passengers bombed in Jerusalem, in Afula, in
Hadera,
in Tel Aviv, were merely "incidents" or "events"; blowing up
supermarkets
was only "inconsistent with what the process was supposed to be about";
casual
murders by stabbing in various streets, or running buses into crowds of
soldiers waiting for lifts, or groups of civilians at bus stops, were
merely
"behavior."
Ross did not mention that the Israeli dupes, disregarding all warnings
from
within Israel, had given Arafat thousands of rifles because he
undertook to
use them against the murderers. The immediate consequence of the "peace
process" was the threefold increase in the rate of murder of Jews by
Arafat's people.
Ross thought it proper to add a piece of advice. He suggests that if
circumstances make future negotiations possible they ought to be based
on
"something the parties have put on the table, and not [what] the United
States has put on the table." Precisely this good advice has been nixed
by
the State Department: which, as we see it, is as busy in our affairs as
it
ever was. And terror goes on.
(The writer is the author of "Hareshet - The Net: The Aaronsohn Family
Saga,"
and a biographer of Ze'ev Jabotinsky.)
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